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ABSTRACT

All countries desire direct satellite broadcasting (DSB) since it can create a telecommunications network without an expensive land-based transmission system. However, with this ability comes disagreement over not only how to use DSB to the greatest benefit, but also how to protect the system from what many see as potentially great misuse. Among the issues that need to be addressed are equal access, the spillover of signals, and the allocation of frequency and orbital slots. To address these concerns, the general trend in international policy-making has been toward more regulation in both access and use. Since the existing treaties governing the deployment and use of satellites are products of compromise and the varied practices within a range of countries, it is not surprising that they often contain contradictory and confusing language. Because of this ambiguity, many interpretations exist as to the meaning of the various treaties concerning countries' use of space. A country's technological expertise, politics, and wealth create difficulties in predicting what stance a country may take concerning DSB. Compromises made by developed countries as a result of Third World and eastern bloc pressure for equal access and protection from cultural or political damage represent affordable concessions given to maintain and protect a current dominance in international telecommunications. (HOD)

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**Direct Satellite Broadcasting: Current International Regulation
and Potential for Worldwide Agreement**

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Direct Satellite Broadcasting: Current International Regulation
and Potential for Worldwide Agreement

With telecommunications regarded as such a necessary factor in building or consolidating a nation's economy,¹ the desire to use direct satellite broadcasting -- which can create a telecommunications network without an expensive land-based transmission system -- is great among all countries, especially those of the Third World.²

¹Donna Demac, George Coddington, Jr., Heather Hudson, and Ram Jakhu, Equity in Orbit: the 1985 ITU Space WARC, (London: International Institute of Communications, June 1985), pp. 6-9; Heather Hudson, When Telephones Reach the Village: the role of telecommunication in rural development, (Norwood, NJ: Ablex Publishing Corp., 1984).

²"TV curb is backed by UN assembly: resolution says nations have right to veto broadcasts direct from satellites," New York Times, 11 December 1982, p. 6; Ithiel de Sola Pool, "Direct Broadcast Satellites and the Integrity of National Cultures," in National Sovereignty and International Communication, ed. Herbert Schiller and Kaarle Nordenstreng, (Norwood, NJ: Ablex Publishing Corporation, 1979), pp. 132-3; David Rice, "Regulation of direct broadcast satellites: international constraints and domestic options," New York Law School Law Review 25 (Fall 1980), p. 816; Thomas A. Hart, Jr., "A Review of WARC-79 and its implications for the development of satellite communications services," Lawyer of the Americas 12 (Spring 1980), p. 452-3.

However, with this ability comes disagreement over how to use DBS to realize the greatest benefit, but also how to protect from what many see as potentially great misuse.³

Much has been written concerning the regulation of DBS, but many of these studies deal with political, geographical, legal, or chronological subtopics of the entire debate. This paper, then, is an attempt to synthesize and present main points in the literature, to briefly examine socio-political factors which affect the regulatory stance of various countries concerning DBS, and to evaluate the likelihood in the near future of a widely-held international agreement about the use and regulation of DBS.

HISTORICAL CONTEXT

The lack of agreement over the uses of DBS has not always been the case. Since 1947, when the possibility of DBS was first predicted, international law concerning satellites favored the developed countries because only they had the technological and economic means to actually make use of space.⁴ It is not surprising, then, that the few countries that could participate

³Demac et. al.; Heather Hudson, "Mixed planning approach at Geneva," Telecommunications Policy 9:4 (December 1985), p. 271; Edward W. Ploman, "Satellite Broadcasting, National Sovereignty, and Free Flow of Information" in National Sovereignty and International Communication, ed. Herbert Schiller and Kaarle Nordenstreng, (Norwood, NJ.: Ablex Publishing Corporation, 1979), pp. 154-165; Rice, p. 819.

⁴Rice, p. 813; James Edwin Bailey III, "Current and future legal uses of direct broadcast satellites in international law," Louisiana Law Review 45:3 (January 1985), p. 703.

made up rules and regulations as they went along, taking into account their own interests without worrying much about other countries' interests.⁵

The current debate today is a direct result of what could be called this "elitist" method of regulation. Since the interests of less developed countries were not taken into account during much of the development of laws and regulations concerning the use of space, the regulatory structure in place does not adequately address the less developed nations' needs. As a result, they are now asserting their claims for equal access to these resources as well as protection from its misuse.⁶

THE TECHNOLOGY

Direct broadcasting by satellite is "the transmission of messages from the satellite directly to community receivers or to individual home sets without the need of local stations to receive and rebroadcast."⁷ A signal is sent to an orbiting satellite, which then amplifies and returns that signal to a pre-determined area of the earth directly to small dish antennae. These dish antennae can be as small as 64 cm and recent estimates

⁵Hart, p. 443.

⁶Howard C. Anawalt, "Direct Television Broadcasting and the Quest for Communication Equality," in Michigan Yearbook of International Legal Studies 1984: Regulation of Transnational Communications, ed. Leslie J. Anderson, (New York: Clark Boardman Company, 1984), pp. 361-77; Hart, pp. 444-9.

⁷Bailey, p. 702.

of how much antennae of this type will cost once mass-produced is as low as \$200.⁸

Although the basis of the technology is clear, a similar degree of clarity does not exist when attempts are made to distinguish direct broadcast satellites from others in order to adequately address what most countries see as their greater potential harm. In international technical regulations, a distinction is drawn between what are called "fixed satellite systems" (FSS) and "broadcast satellite systems" (BSS). If the signal is meant for point-to-point or point-to-multipoint reception for rebroadcast over terrestrial systems, the satellite which provides that service can be classified as FSS. On the other hand, if the signal is meant for direct reception by individual or small community antennae then it is BSS.⁹

In practice, though, such a clean distinction is not possible. Newer generations of satellites can switch between a point-to-point and a broadcast mode; one example is Canada's Anik 2.¹⁰ Also, signals meant for point-to-point reception can be intercepted (in essence, can be direct broadcast signals) by

⁸Wigand.

⁹Martin Rothblatt, "ITU regulation of satellite communication," Stanford Journal of International Law 18 (Spring 1982); Rice, pp. 816-7; Rolf T. Wigand, "Direct Satellite Broadcasting: Definitions and Prospects," in World Communications: A Handbook, ed. George Gerbner and Marsha Siefert, (New York: Longman Inc., 1984), pp. 246-53.

¹⁰E.D. DuCharme, M.J.R. Irwin, and R.F. Zeitoun, "Direct Broadcast by satellite -- the development of the international technical and regulatory regime," Annals of Air & Space Law 9 (1984), pp. 267-90.

those with the equipment able to do so. The difficulty in arriving at an acceptably precise definition is one factor which makes regulation difficult.

ISSUES OF EQUAL ACCESS AND SPILLOVER

One issue which affects the placement of all types of satellites is the issue of equal access. Direct broadcast satellites, along with many others, must be placed in the geosynchronous orbit -- 22,300 miles up and directly over the equator. When placed in this specific spot, they orbit in time with the earth's rotation and are stationary with respect to one point on earth, thereby maximizing their utility and efficiency.¹¹

Since only a finite number of satellites can occupy this slot without having their signals interfere with each other or possibly even physically colliding with each other, and since a great number of countries wish to use this limited orbital slot, the placement of satellites -- DBS or otherwise -- is a process of allocating scarce resources.¹² Although some disputes have arisen concerning the allocation of both frequencies and orbital slots, none has of yet erupted into a major crisis.¹³ There is a

¹¹Bailey, p. 710.

¹²Demac et. al., p. 6; Rothblatt, p. 7-8; Carolyn A. Lin, "Who Owns the Orbit: Policy Options for Orbit/Spectrum Planning," paper presented at ICA convention, Chicago, May 1986.

¹³"Third World seeks its place in space (International Telecommunications agency holds a conference)," New York Times, 15 September 1985, sec. 4, p. E7; "AUSSAT: Japan agrees to move over," Intermedia 13:6 (November 1985), p. 9; Rothblatt, p. 15.

mutually beneficial reason to maintain technical order; the only alternative would be chaos where all countries' systems would be rendered unusable.¹⁴ Since 1959, the International Telecommunications Union has been the international forum for countries (one country, one vote) to present their needs and cases for allocation of these resources, and it has generally been able to accommodate them.¹⁵

In addition to allocating frequency and orbital slots, another issue is "spillover." Since the signal that is beamed to earth -- while somewhat controllable -- cannot be made to conform to non-oval-shaped national boundaries, it can unintentionally bleed into other countries. Signals could also be intentionally beamed into another country.¹⁶

This potential problem has not been realized yet. The majority of satellites now in orbit are FSS rather than BSS. Multi-point or point-to-point signals do not pose the cultural or political threat that unidirectional signals from DBS do; they are not intended for the general public's direct use and are channeled for distribution to the public via ground stations, hence the diffusion of the signal is easily controlled from a few central locations.¹⁷ This ability to shape the information

¹⁴Rice, p. 815.

¹⁵Demac et. al., p. 10.

¹⁶Ploman, p. 163; "Prime Minister suggests TV satellites could be used to beam propaganda into Russia," London Times, 5 May 1980, p. 2E.

¹⁷Rothblatt, p. 9.

coming into a country fits well with many Third World and eastern bloc governments' wishes to protect citizens from what they perceive to be culturally damaging or politically destabilizing programming.

Programming transmitted by direct broadcast satellite, on the other hand, bypasses central points of control since the signal can be picked up directly by anyone using a small inexpensive dish antenna and their home television set.¹⁸ Some researchers have pointed to the small cost of the equipment -- in industrialized nations' standards -- as still much too expensive for residents in Third World countries to afford. Hence, the signal may bleed into their countries, but no one could afford the equipment to pick up the signal.¹⁹ But these arguments, while reasonable, do not provide any guidelines for solving disputes, nor do they propose any solutions to problems stemming from a lack of agreed-upon regulation concerning the uses of DBS.

CURRENT REGULATORY ATMOSPHERE

To address these concerns, the general trend in international regulatory policy-making bodies -- the ITU, UNESCO, the UN -- has been towards more regulation, both in attempts to

¹⁸DuCharme et. al., pp. 269-70.

¹⁹Bailey, p. 702; Yrjo Littunen, "Cultural Problems of direct broadcast satellites," International Social Science Journal 32:2 (1980), pp. 283-303; Wigand, p. 252.

regulate access and also to regulate use.²⁰ To insure the technical order and the workability of the system worldwide, regulation of access is necessary because of the scarcity of orbital and frequency resources, and because of the increasing number of countries that are demanding their share of these resources.²¹ It has become increasingly difficult to balance equality of access with efficient use of these resources; the effort to regulate the permissible uses of DBS and take into account all countries' concerns has been even more difficult.

Potential sources of DBS regulation are largely in the realm of international law because the problem is one of relations between countries. International law can arise either from treaties or from customary international law. Some basic characteristics of each must be mentioned to better understand the basis of the current regulatory debate.²²

One major distinguishing characteristic between treaty or customary law is in how each is generated. Treaties are signed agreements that are most often used for addressing specific problems and situations because they can spell out very detailed remedies. Because of their specificity, treaties are good for heading off problems before they become problems. Treaties can

²⁰Bailey, p. 707; Michel G. Bourelly, "The contributions made by international organizations to the formation of space law," Journal of Space Law 10:1 (Fall 1982), pp. 139-55; DuCharme, et. al., pp. 267-8; Rice, p. 816; "TV Curb is backed by U.N. Assembly."

²¹Demac, et. al., p. 6; Rothblatt, pp. 2-17.

²²Vladlen S. Vereshchetin and Gennady M. Danilenko, "Custom as a Source of International Law of Outer Space," Journal of Space Law 13:1 (Spring 1985), pp. 22-35.

also codify the rules for the orderly development of, in this case, direct satellite broadcasting.

International customary law, on the other hand, does not exhibit a treaty's specificity. It embodies general guidelines instead of specific remedies, and this more general character of international customary law reflects how it comes into being. Where treaties arise from a meeting between countries, customary law arises from the constant and uniform practice of countries. Specifically, four general requirements must be met: generality, consistency, uniformity and opinio juris. How long a practice takes to become recognized as customary international law depends on the degree to which it fulfills these requirements. One which is adopted uniformly and immediately by all countries can become customary international law in a very short time.

Each is as binding and as powerful a means of regulation as the other, but each has its characteristic limitations. Treaties are not binding on countries that do not sign them. Customary international law is binding on all countries; however, it can arise only out of widespread agreement in practice among countries. Without general agreement among countries, the existence of customary international law in a certain situation is questionable.²³

TREATIES CONCERNING DBS

Because the existing instruments governing the deployment and use of satellites in space are products of compromise, it is

²³Vereshchetin and Danilenko, pp. 22-31.

not surprising that they contain language which is often contradictory and confusing.²⁴ Because of this ambiguity, many interpretations exist as to the meaning of the various treaties concerning countries' use of space.

Of the five U.N. space treaties, the only one that seems applicable to DBS is the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, but phrases such as use "for the benefit and in the interests of all countries," and use "in accordance with international law, including the Charter of the United Nations, in the interest of maintaining international peace and security and promoting international co-operation and understanding" are sufficiently broad and contradictory to be subject to many different interpretations.²⁵

Since the 1973 ITU Convention has been ratified by every country on earth and binds them with treaty force, the ITU potentially has the authority to regulate use of DBS.²⁶ Although DBS can be seen as purely a domestic issue since the signal usually originates in and is beamed back to the same country, the ITU regulations come into play when a signal spills into another country.²⁷

²⁴Bailey, pp. 705-6; "Text of UN document on satellite direct TV broadcasting [transcript]," New York Times, 11 December 1982, p. 6; UNESCO, "Declaration of Guiding Principles on the Use of Satellite Broadcasting for the Free Flow of Information, the Spread of Education and Greater Cultural Exchange," adopted in Paris, 15 November 1972.

²⁵Bailey, pp. 703-6; Demac et. al., p. 6.

²⁶Bailey, pp. 706-8; Rice, p. 814.

²⁷Bailey, p. 706.

Recognizing both the shortcomings in existing international law and their political majority in international regulatory bodies such as the ITU, Third World and eastern bloc countries are calling for more and more regulation to counter the cultural and political threat posed by DBS.²⁸ The first World Administrative Radio Conference (WARC) which dealt specifically with DBS was called in 1977 largely as a result of these concerns. At WARC-77, plans were made for allocation of frequency and orbital resources for DBS in Regions 1 and 3 -- essentially everywhere except North and South America.²⁹ A plan for Region 2 was drawn up in 1983, but it also dealt only with the allocation of orbital and frequency resources, not with regulating the use of DBS.³⁰

One rule adopted by the ITU, though, that refers specifically to DBS and the problem of spillover is WARC Provision number 428A which states that "all technical means available shall be used to reduce to the maximum extent practicable the radiation over the territory of other countries unless an agreement has been reached with such other countries."³¹ However, qualifications such as "to the maximum extent practicable" subject this seemingly well-defined provision to many different interpretations. Some countries -- mainly eastern bloc and Third

²⁸Demac et. al., pp. 10-14.

²⁹DuCharme et. al., pp. 272-5; Hart, pp. 449-51; Rice, pp. 817-8.

³⁰DuCharme et. al., pp 272-5.

³¹Bailey, p. 708; DuCharme et. al., p. 270.

World -- claim that the provision is intended to absolutely prohibit spillover and that it requires the prior consent of potentially affected countries. Other countries -- mainly the United States -- claim it is a technical guideline only, not absolutely prohibiting spillover, and not requiring prior agreements with other countries. But this has been the extent of the ITU's efforts. Since its inception it has been primarily a technical regulatory body rather than a policy-making one and has not yet been the source of any specific treaties concerning the use of DBS.³²

The disagreement over the meaning of these treaty articles indicates both the range of views and the lack of agreement among countries concerning the use of DBS.³³ Treaties also are ineffective since none except the 1973 ITU Convention have been ratified by a majority of countries.³⁴ Since they do not specifically address the issue of the permissible uses of DBS, it is unlikely that any existing treaties will be useful in solving any such disputes.

CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW

Lacking any codified body of law such as a treaty, the only other source of law is derived from the established practice of countries. The practice of countries in outer space is seen by many to have established some rules of customary international

³²Bailey, pp. 708-9.

³³"TV Curb is backed by U.N. Assembly."

³⁴Bailey, p. 709.

law, but the only widely accepted rules regarding the use of space are that space resources should be available to all and appropriated by none.

Since these principles are incorporated into the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, they constitute both treaty and international customary law. But, like the treaties, these two generally accepted principles of customary international law are too broad and ambiguous to solve the debate over the permissible uses of DBS. The push by the Soviet Union and many Third World countries for an additional multi-lateral agreement that would explicitly prohibit spillover without the consent of the affected country seems to indicate the powerlessness of existing international law.³⁵

A number of declarations and guiding principles have been proposed, but they have not been accepted by the majority of countries and do not constitute any acknowledged customary international law. Since they are not treaties, they also do not have the standing or the binding force of treaties.³⁶ But what they do show is the range of disagreement concerning the permissible uses of DBS.³⁷

During the 1980 meeting of the UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS), extreme positions were taken by the United States and the Soviet Union. The United States, along with the UK, West Germany, and Italy, felt that "free

³⁵Bailey, p. 707.

³⁶Rice, pp. 817-21.

³⁷Pool, p. 130.

dissemination of information across frontiers and the right to receive and impart information were essential," with the West German delegation adding that "all efforts at regulation should be made within limits of full respect for the principle of free flow of information, freedom of the press and opinion."³⁸

In contrast, the Soviet Union's position -- shared by Poland, Romania, and Chile -- was that "the DBS issue should be decided on the basis of the sovereign rights of States and consent of the receiving State should be a prerequisite to DBS." Other countries that echoed this concern included Egypt, Mexico, Ecuador, France, Indonesia, and Colombia.³⁹ A similar range of views was expressed during the drafting of the "Principles Governing the Use by States of Artificial Earth Satellites for International Direct Television Broadcasting."⁴⁰

Predictably, countries such as the Soviet Union -- where the role of the mass media is generally to support the government and its objectives -- favor strong sanctions to prevent political or cultural damage from unauthorized direct satellite broadcasting. Western industrialized countries such as the United States that

³⁸"1980 UNCOPUOS: Highlights of Positions," Journal of Space Law 8:2 (Fall 1980): 178-180.

³⁹"1980 UNCOPUOS: Highlights of Positions," pp. 178-180.

⁴⁰"Texts of draft principles as contained in the Report of the Legal Sub-Committee on the work of its eighteenth session: principles governing the use by states of artificial earth satellites for (international) direct television broadcasting," Journal of Space Law 8:2 (Fall 1980), pp. 188-192; "United Nations: General Assembly resolution on principles governing the use by states of artificial earth satellites for direct television broadcasting," International Legal Materials 22 (March 1983), pp. 451-454; Anawalt, p. 365; Bailey, pp. 711-3; Pool, pp. 135-7.

share a belief in the desirability of the free flow of information favor little or no regulation which might hinder it.

UN declarations, while valuable as a means of presenting and sharing views, have not resulted in any concrete interpretations shared by all countries which could provide the basis for more binding and stable agreements.⁴¹

OTHER FACTORS AFFECTING THE STANCE OF COUNTRIES

Third World and eastern bloc countries hope to head off the irreversible effects of cultural dilution or political interference by instituting comprehensive and detailed regulations. Towards these ends, these countries favor treaties that would spell out in detail responsibilities and the remedies available should these regulations be broken, and that would apply uniformly to all countries worldwide.

The United States and a handful of other industrialized countries oppose such worldwide treaties. Since they do not perceive the damaging effects of DBS that the Third World and eastern bloc do, and since they believe that free flow of information is actually beneficial, they prefer the current system of law being established by the practice of countries, and that any disputes should be solved through separate negotiations between the countries involved. They feel that a treaty would be an unnecessary and a dangerously inflexible method of regulation

⁴¹Bailey, pp. 714-8; Ploman, p. 161; Pool, p. 134; Hart, pp. 449-52.

that might actually hinder the development of the technology and the potential benefits of DBS for all countries.⁴²

To adequately understand the stance of countries concerning the use of DBS, additional factors must be taken into consideration.⁴³ One important factor that affects a country's stance is its relative geographic isolation. Since a DBS signal can cover about 1 million square miles (an area about the size of India, or one-third the size of the United States),⁴⁴ larger, more isolate countries such as the United States are potentially much less affected by signals from other countries. But in densely-packed regions such as Western Europe, access and spillover are much more pressing issues.⁴⁵

Augmenting its geographic isolation is the United States' dominance in worldwide commercial programming. Cries of cultural imperialism and of political disruption are not raised in the United States for the reason that much of the objected-to commercial programming originates in the United States.⁴⁶

⁴²Hudson, "Mixed planning approach at Geneva," pp. 271-2; "Third World seeks its place in space"; Bailey, pp. 719-20; Delbert D. Smith, "Using Space Platforms to Deliver TV," Intermedia 12:1 (January 1984), pp. 19-20; Albert D. Wheelon, "The Futures of Communications Satellites," Intermedia 12:2 (March 1984), pp. 40-49.

⁴³Rothblatt, pp. 17-8.

⁴⁴Frits W. Hondius, "Steps Toward a European Agreement on Satellite Broadcasting," in Michigan Yearbook of International Legal Studies 1984: Regulation of Transnational Communications, ed. Leslie J. Anderson, (New York: Clark Boardman Company, 1984), pp. 103-124;

⁴⁵Don R. LeDuc, "Direct Broadcast Satellites: parallel policy patterns in Europe and the United States," Journal of Broadcasting 27 (Spring 1983), pp. 99-118.

⁴⁶Rice, p. 815.

Yet another factor is a country's technological expertise and economic wealth. Along with the United States having a high degree of both, informal pressure to safeguard the U.S. advantage might come from American multinational corporations, since they stand to potentially lose some overseas business should regulations restricting the flow of information be instituted.

Complicating these relatively consistent factors are a mass of situational factors which add tremendously to the difficulty of predicting what stance a country or region may take concerning DBS or other space resource issues. American delegates to the WARC ORB-85 found this out when, after a months-long lobbying effort to garner enough support for their plan to be proposed at the WARC, unforeseen circumstances modified the composition and strength of their coalition to no end.⁴⁷

CONCLUSIONS

The regulatory stance that American policy makers are now taking appears to reflect their own attempt to protect their dominance both in information and in technology.⁴⁸ With economic, programming, and technological dominance, the U.S. has greatly benefitted and would continue to benefit from the lack of rules which might hinder their dominance. Maximum flexibility means the maximum degree of freedom to shape the regulatory

⁴⁷"Space WARC primed to make history," Broadcasting, 13 May 1985, p. 82; "Space WARC-ers back Home again," Broadcasting, 17 June 1985, p. 46; "Developing Countries' demands Key to U.S. Space WARC proposal," Broadcasting, 15 July 1985, p. 34; "Working up to WARC," Broadcasting, 29 July 1985, p. 52; Pool, p. 134.

⁴⁸Hudson, "Mixed planning approach at Geneva," p. 272.

system largely as it wishes. But, at the same time, the U.S. call for no regulation is shared by only a few countries. The question, then, is who will give in.

The tentative answer seems to be that, at least initially, the U.S. is perceiving the utility of pursuing a less extreme line. In the most recent WARC held in August and September 1985, the U.S. agreed to a compromise in the planning and the allocation of orbital and frequency resources to insure Third World countries' access to these space resources when they are technologically and economically able to use them.⁴⁹

Despite this magnanimity, it also seems that U.S. delegates gave up what they perceived to be less desirable or little used spots in order to protect more valuable spots. According to the New York Times, at the conclusion of the WARC ORB-85, Steve Levi -- an American delegate to the WARC -- said, "the U.S. is not too happy. . . .but we can accept this because it limits [Third World] reservations [of orbital slots and frequencies] to [frequency] bands less used by the United States. It was this, or nothing."⁵⁰

Although recent concessions have been made by developed

⁴⁹"Curtain going up on Space WARC," Broadcasting, 5 August 1985, p. 74; "WARC Approaches Home Stretch: Key Issues Unresolved," Broadcasting, 2 September 1985, p. 38; "U.S. Achieves Modicum of progress at WARC on satellites for audio," Broadcasting, 16 September 1985, p. 74; "The Way It Was and Wasn't at WARC-85," Broadcasting, 4 November 1985, p. 70; Ronald F. Stowe, "The legal and political considerations of the 1985 World Administrative Radio Conference," Journal of Space Law 11 (Spring/Fall 1983): 61-65; Hudson, "Mixed Planning Approach at Geneva."

⁵⁰"Third World seeks its place in space."

nations concerning DBS, they are not dramatic changes made as a result of Third World and eastern bloc pressure for equality of access and protection from cultural or political damage. What the compromises do represent are affordable concessions by the developed countries given in an effort to maintain and protect their current dominance in international telecommunications.

It appears that, as long as the valuable space resources are not threatened, the U.S. is willing to compromise, and the possibility grows of an agreement that might accommodate all countries' interests.⁵¹ However, should its dominance be threatened in any substantial way, a reversal of this trend is very likely, one that would negate the notable moves recently made towards worldwide agreement.

⁵¹Demac et. al., pp. 16-7; Hart, pp. 456-9.